USMC Tanks and Ontos at Khe Sanh

Describes the role of Marine Corps armor at Khe Sanh

INTRODUCTION
I wrote this article at the suggestion of LtCol Raymond A. Stewart, USMC (Retired), president and founder of the Marine Corps Vietnam Historical Tankers Foundation. Ray Stewart and the foundation promote the study of Marine tankers in Vietnam. Ray spent many weeks giving me encouragement, inspiration, information, and editorial guidance. Various other members of the foundation also provided useful material. Chaplain Ray Stubbe, USN (Retired) has done more to preserve the history of the Marines at Khe Sanh than anyone. Ray Stubbe generously gave permission to use his materials (published and unpublished), for my research. I offer my sincere thanks to these two former naval officers for their assistance, and to their commitment to history. I could not have written this article without it.

BACKGROUND
The 1968 battle of Khe Sanh was the longest, most expensive, most controversial, and arguably deadliest battle of the Vietnam War. Marine armor, consisting of M-48 tanks and M50 Ontos antitank vehicles, were present throughout. Marines Tankers and Ontos crewmen are innovative. Marine armor at Khe Sanh deployed its assets in a variety of creative ways to keep themselves relevant in the unique battlefield situation. This article describes the various contributions of USMC tanks and Ontos to the fight at Khe Sanh.

The Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) was located on Route 9 in Quang Tri province in the northwest corner of the former South Vietnam, six miles east of the border with Laos and 14 miles south of the border with the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Vietnam. The nearby village of Khe Sanh, inhabited by Vietnamese and Montagnards, was a district capital. In 1962, U.S. Army Special Forces and South Vietnamese troops established a position near the village. It was used to conduct reconnaissance missions into the surrounding hill country in order to report enemy infiltration. In 1966, fighting between the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Marines increased in intensity along the DMZ. This Marine blocking force encouraged the NVA to make an end-run around the DMZ and enter South Vietnam from Laos. This made the area around the Khe Sanh base a logical route of entry for Communist infiltration.

The M50 Ontos was a heavily armed, lightly armored nine ton tracked vehicle originally designed to destroy enemy tanks. Although there were numerous sightings of NVA tanks in the Khe Sanh TAOR, none ever attacked the base itself. Instead, Ontos’ six 106-mm recoilless rifles, which could be fired in various combinations, were deployed in a variety of infantry support roles. The rifles fired a variety of rounds. According to Ontos crewman Scott Berry, most often used were HEPT (High Explosive Plastic Tracer) rounds. Also used were HEAT (High Explosive Antitank) rounds, suitable for destroying enemy bunkers. Beehive antipersonnel rounds, each containing 9500 flechettes, were effective for clearing tree lines of enemy personnel, including snipers. These rounds employed a variable fuse that would detonate the round at a user-set distance of between 75 and 3,300 meters.[1] The Ontos had a crew of three, which had to load the recoilless rifles, while exposed, from outside the vehicle.

The M-48A3 Patton tank, with a crew of four, was a much larger vehicle, weighing 52 tons. According to Marine Tanker Chris Vargo, its 90mm main gun could fire a broad range of ammunition types. Tankers used the devastating canister round to clear thick jungle, tall elephant grass, wooded areas, and massed enemy troops. These rounds were filled with 1,281 spherical steel pellets. Also available were high explosive plastic (HEP) rounds for taking out bunkers and structures of all types; HE and HE Delay for use against personnel and fortifications; white phosphorus (WP) for marking targets and for use against personnel; and HEAT for use against other tanks and fortifications. The 90mm gun was a high-velocity flat trajectory, and highly accurate weapon with a range of up to 14 miles.[2] Even though the Marines at Khe Sanh had a battery of larger caliber 155mm guns (range: 14,950 meters), only the tank 90mm guns could reach into Laos in order to attack NVA artillery and tanks located there.[3] The Patton tank had a .30 caliber machine gun coaxially mounted with the 90mm main gun and a cupola mounted .50 caliber machine gun, all of which were used extensively against the enemy.

Tanks and Ontos were organized similarly into light sections (two vehicles), heavy sections (three vehicles), platoons (five vehicles), and companies (three platoons of five vehicles). The light section was normally commanded by the platoon sergeant and the heavy section by the platoon commander when the platoon was split up. A captain commanded the tank and Ontos companies.

By February 1967, a single company of Marines, reinforced by a 45-man security platoon and a battery of 105mm howitzers (Company B, 1^st Battalion, 9^th Marines, USMC Captain Michael W. Sayers commanding) defended Khe Sanh. Company B’s mission was to defend the airstrip and patrol out to 15,000 meters.[4] Captain Sayers was responsible for the defense of the entire perimeter. He was concerned by the increasing NVA threats to the base. Sayers expressed these concerns to USMC Brigadier General Michael Ryan, 3d Marine Division (Fwd) commander. Gen Ryan agreed to send additional firepower as soon as road conditions allowed, and directed the 11^th Engineering Battalion to open Route 9, the only land route from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh. A light section of Ontos (2 vehicles) provided security for the engineers. Route 9 in this part of Quang Tri province was in very poor condition, and opening it to heavy traffic was important in order to diminish the reliance on aerial logistic support of Khe Sanh.

On 27 March an armed military convoy (called a “Rough Rider” convoy) consisting of 68 vehicles left Dong Ha for Khe Sanh. These were the first vehicles to travel to Khe Sanh via Route 9 since September, 1964. Two Ontos accompanied the convoy. These Ontos were from the 2^nd Platoon, Company A, 3d Antitank Battalion, Second Lieutenant Phillip Sauer commanding. The convoy left Dong Ha at 0832 hours, and arrived around noon without incident. The Ontos remained at Khe Sanh to augment base security when the convoy returned to Dong Ha.[5] They were the first Marine Corps armored vehicles at Khe Sanh. According to Alpha Company’s command chronology, “Upon arrival went in direct support of SOP 3d Marine Division, concept of operations to be developed. One Ontos at CP as part of provisional heavy section.”[6] Khe Sanh had become a dangerous place: 23 Marines were killed in action during March 1967.[7]

During the morning of 24 April 1967, a patrol from Company B moved to a position west of the combat base, near Hill 861. Its mission was to provide mortar fire support for two platoons conducting a nearby company sweep. The foot patrol was accompanied by Lieutenant Sauer of the Ontos section. The patrol leader, Second Lieutenant Thomas King, dispatched a five-man team to proceed to the top of Hill 861 and establish an observation post. This team was led by Lieutenant Sauer, who wanted to learn if it was possible to move Ontos up to the hill position. According to Scott Berry, a member of Sauer’s Ontos platoon, team members tried to talk Sauer into taking an M-14 rifle or a “grease gun” (.45-caliber submachine gun). Sauer declined, and was armed only with a .45 caliber automatic pistol.[8] About 300 meters from the top of the hill the patrol was ambushed by 20-30 NVA. The point man was hit. Sauer and another Marine, PFC William Marks, took cover in a foxhole. When the NVA “began plastering them with fire,” Sauer and Marks decided to make a run for it. Sauer told Marks to move down the hill and join the others while he [Sauer] provided covering fire. “I took off and it was the last I ever saw of him,” Marks later explained, “They’re all dead. The other four. All dead.” Lieutenant King immediately dispatched a squad to retrieve the four bodies. They found two, neither of them Sauer, but were forced to withdraw due to heavy NVA fire. Sauer was the first Marine killed in action (KIA) from the Marine tank and Ontos units at Khe Sanh. The aggressive patrolling by the Marines of B/1/9 apparently prematurely disclosed NVA plans to mount a strong attack on Khe Sanh Combat Base.[9] The attacked was launched the following month. Casualties from the resulting hill fights during the period 24 April to 13 May 1967 were 168 US KIA, 443 US WIA, 2 US MIA, 824 NVA KIA (confirmed), 551 NVA KIA (probable). 6 NVA POWs were captured.

On 21 May, Khe Sanh Ontos assets were augmented by the arrival of one Ontos airlifted from Phu Bai. The following day the headquarters of Company A was displaced to Khe Sanh to augment Ontos support for the 26^th Marines, the regimental headquarters at Khe Sanh.[10] Defense of the base perimeter of Khe Sanh was a joint effort; while Marine infantry battalions were responsible for most of it, responsibility for the western or RED Sector was assigned Company A of the 3d Antitank Battalion.[11]

Marine engineers continued to upgrade Route 9 until it could support 60-ton traffic. On 28 June 1967, a platoon of tanks from Company B, 3d Tank Battalion moved from Camp Carroll to Khe Sanh.[12] These were the first Marine tanks at the Khe Sanh Combat Base. The following month, Marine armor assets at Khe Sanh consisted of the following:

CO A(-), 3d AntiTank Battalion (Ten M 50A1 Ontos); three officers and 51 enlisted.
3d Plt, CO B, 3d Tank Battalion (Five M48A3 tanks); one officer, 22 enlisted.[13]

The NVA increased the pressure on Khe Sanh and the Route 9 supply route to the base. 82mm mortar rounds and 102mm rockets struck the base while Rough Rider convoys faced the threat of mines and ambushes. On 17 June, two Ontos on patrol with L/3/26 ascended Hill 861, demonstrating the cross-country mobility of the Ontos. Ontos and tanks were used to insert reconnaissance teams. Ontos made reconnaissance trips along Route 9 to near the Laotian border in preparation for anticipated fire missions at targets on enemy infiltration routes. On 27 June, during a rocket and mortar attack, Ontos counter mortar fire resulted in one secondary explosion. One Corpsman was wounded in this attack. [14] During the month of June, 60 Marines and Navy Corpsmen were killed in the Khe Sanh Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). In July, 21 more Marines and Corpsmen died.[15] These actions were part of Operation Crockett, which ended on 16 July. Crockett was followed by Operation Ardmore, which lasted until 31 October.

Early rains in August limited the mobility of Marine armor. The tanks of Company B were utilized in perimeter defense and occasional indirect and harassment and interdiction (H&I) fire.[16] On 21 August, a light section of two Ontos, providing security for a convoy from Khe Sanh to Ca Lu, was attacked by an estimated two battalions of NVA. The Ontos responded with six rounds of 106 mm HEPT and .30 caliber machine gun fire, resulting in 6 confirmed NVA KIA, 10 probable NVA KIA, and one NVA POW. More mundane activities during August included road sweeps, patrols, and additional convoy escorts.[17] Five Marines were killed at Khe Sanh in August.[18]

During the period 16-18 September, 23.24 inches of rain fell on Khe Sanh. By the end of the month, six bridges connecting Khe Sanh with the supply depot at Dong Ha had been washed out, closing Route 9 and preventing overland logistical support for KSCB. Clouds and fog associated with the monsoon weather also severely limited aerial resupply to the combat base and surrounding hill outposts. Only CH-53 helicopters and small C-7 Caribou airplanes could land, weather permitting. As one Marine described the situation in a letter to his parents, “Well yesterday [06Sep67] we welcomed in a new season. No, it is not autumn or fall. It is the monsoon. The monsoon turns dirt to mud, chow to soup, and Marines to wet semblances of human beings. It rained for 25 hours yesterday.” These conditions severely limited the mobility of the tanks and Ontos, “Driving is a matter of carefully choosing the right rut, the least of bad holes and ditches, sliding sideways most of the time, gliding into tree stumps . . . . “[19] With Route 9 washed out, Company A’s Ontos were employed in a base defense role; all requests for fire support were cleared by the 26^th Marines Fire Direction Center prior to firing of the missions.[20] The heavy rains curtailed all cross-country mobility of the heavy tanks, reducing their role to reinforcement of the Khe Sanh defense perimeter.[21] Previously, before Route 9 was opened, Marine armor was unable to get to Khe Sanh. Now, with the highway again closed, Marine armor could not have left even if ordered to do so.

During October, Company A, 3d Antitank Battalion improved its position in the Red Sector on the western perimeter of the combat base. New defensive wire and a new Combat Operations Center were constructed. On 7 October, all main guns of the Ontos employed on the perimeter were loaded during the hours of darkness. Ontos and tanks employed on the perimeter were moved each night after dark to new locations in order to minimize the possibility of the NVA scoring a first round hit with antitank weapons. It was also a tactic to employ the inherent mobility of these vehicles in an environment where their overall mobility was compromised by local conditions of weather and geography. Defensive positions, including defensive wires, were inspected a minimum of six times each day. All wire was inspected at sunrise and sunset. In addition to base defense, light sections and the headquarters section were utilized as a security force for air-drop recovery operations outside the perimeter.[22]

BUILD-UP OF FORCES
On 1 November 1967, the operation in the Khe Sanh area was named Operation Scotland. From 15-21 November, Marine infantry, engineering, and Ontos units conducted a study to determine if the Marine position on Hill 881S could be supplied by ground forces. The conclusion of the study was that tracked vehicles could not reach the hill positions without extensive engineering efforts.[23] As Khe Sanh Combat Base was cut off from resupply by overland means, so too were the fortified hill positions cut off from overland supply from the base. All resupply for the approximately 6,000 Marines would be provided by aircraft. By this time the ground force consisted of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, armor, and engineers in addition to shore party, air control, and communications units. The base itself was supported by a line of heavily fortified elevated strongpoints to the west, northwest, and north of the base.[24]

On 15 December, Company A, 3d Antitank Battalion was redesignated Company A (Rein) and attached to the 3d Tank Battalion (the Ontos of Companies B and C were reduced to zero balance but not deactivated. Instead, members of these Ontos companies were assigned to other units in the 3d Marine Division). On 28 December, three Ontos were assigned to the GRAY and GRAY-ALPHA sectors (eastern and southern portions of the base) in support of Company B, 1^st Battalion, 26^th Marines, who had responsibility for those portions of the perimeter.[25]

Enemy activity around Khe Sanh was light in late 1967. Two Marines were killed in September. The following month one Marine and seven other American servicemen were KIA. In November, three more Marines plus seven soldiers and airmen died. Four more Marines were killed in December.[26] According to the December 1967 3d Tank Battalion Command Chronology, tank “support was limited to participation in one patrol during which ten rounds of 90mm HE were fired at suspected anti-aircraft positions.”[27] This period was a lull before the storm; according to Major Harper L. Bohr, Jr., the 26^th Marine regimental intelligence officer, NVA capabilities at this time included the following:

The ability to conduct reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance operations against Khe Sanh and nearby US military positions.
The ability to infiltrate men and supplies into the Khe Sanh TOAR to support local combat operations.
The ability to conduct mortar and rocket attacks against Khe Sanh and surrounding hill positions.
The ability to conduct multi-battalion coordinated attacks against Khe Sanh and surrounding positions.
The ability of drawing friendly forces into contact on terrain of the enemy’s choosing, encircling them and ambushing friendly reinforcements.

According to Major Bohr, the NVA would “probably employ” all these capabilities.[28] Major Bohr’s predictions turned out to be deadly accurate. By mid-January 1968, enemy forces in the vicinity of Khe Sanh numbered about 22,000, and included infantry, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, rocket, engineer, armor, signal, and reconnaissance units. Supporting units in Laos and the central DMZ pushed the total forces facing the Americans to between 35,000 and 40,000.[29]

Marine Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, Commanding General of III Marine Amphibious Force, inspected the defenses of the Khe Sanh Combat Base during a mid-January visit. Cushman told the base commander, Colonel David Lownds, “On the whole, the defenses are excellent, I know you can stand off any attack and punish the enemy decisively.” Still, General Cushman was concerned that the eastern end of the runway extended beyond the perimeter wire, leaving the base vulnerable to a NVA ground attack down the runway.[30] This gap lay between the lines manned by two different Marine infantry companies. Each night these Marines rigged a type of barbed wire called “German tape” across this 60-foot opening. German tape contained razor sharp pieces of metal and was especially difficult to breach. To add to the entry challenge, two Ontos, each loaded with beehive rounds, covered this end of the runway.[31]

The Marines at Khe Sanh knew from various intelligence sources they were surrounded. They remained in a high state of readiness. NVA intentions were confirmed at 1400 hours on 20 January, when an infantry platoon on the northeastern side of the runway was in position with an Ontos preparing to fire. These Marines noticed a NVA outside the wire, waving a white flag. A Marine fire team, covered by the Ontos, moved about 500 meters outside the wire and accepted the surrender of NVA Lieutenant La Thanh Tonc, commanding officer of a NVA antiaircraft company. Lieutenant Tonc told the Marines there would be an attack on both Hill 861 and the combat base, probably that night.

THE 1968 BATTLE BEGINS
At 0530 on 21 January 1968, NVA artillery, rocket, and mortar fire struck the airstrip and nearby bunkers and trench lines. A bunker containing two Marines from the Ontos section received a direct hit. The Marines emerged in a state of shock but were not seriously wounded.[32] NVA shells hit ASP Number 1, the main ammunition supply point for the base. The result was the explosion of over 1,500 tons of ammunition, C-4 explosives and CS gas. The first NVA round landed in the 1^st Battalion, 13^th Marines area, destroying the generator that powered the artillery unit’s fire control computer. The Marines fired back, computing firing data manually.[33] Company B tanks joined the artillerymen in the fight attacking NVA positions. Tank fire missions immediately after the battle demonstrate the variety of ways tanks were utilized: 21 January, 18 HE and one WP round at suspected enemy troop concentrations, 12 HE and 1 WP at suspected enemy firing sites; 22 January, tanks fired 43 rounds of direct HE fire plus three beehive rounds at enemy troops; 23 January, tanks fired HE rounds of indirect fire on request of an infantry unit under attack to the east, followed by two missions of direct HE rounds at enemy mortar sites; 24 January, Company B fired 12 HE rounds of direct fire at NVA mortar sites, resulting in one secondary explosion.[34] 54 Marines were killed at Khe Sanh in January, along with 18 soldiers and airmen.[35]

A few miles west of Khe Sanh on Route 9 was the U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. During the night of 6-7 February 1968, the camp was attacked and overrun by an NVA regiment, supported by a company of Soviet-built PT-76 tanks. This was the first use of armor by the North Vietnamese in the war in Vietnam. These tanks posed a threat to the Marines at Khe Sanh. Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, felt the threat was manageable. Given the terrain, NVA tanks would have to come from the west, via Route 9. The base’s four Marine infantry battalions possessed 32 106mm recoilless rifles and 180 3.5” rocket launchers, all of which fired armor piercing rounds.[36] Additionally, the tanks and Ontos provided even more powerful antitank capabilities. Route 9 ran to the south of the combat base. This tactical situation accounts for the deployment of many of the tanks and Ontos to the south and southwest of the base along the roads that were likely NVA attack routes.

NVA tanks continued to operate in the eastern portion of the Khe Sanh TAOR, in the Laos-South Vietnam border area. Enemy forces were improving the road system from Laos to Khe Sanh. Photographic intelligence showed the NVA were constructing roads that would allow the movement of heavy equipment including tanks, self-propelled guns and trucks. These included roads that had not been used since 1965.[37] NVA tanks were also spotted operating in the at the location of the overrun Special Forces base at Lang Vei.[38]

Adjacent to the Marine base at Khe Sanh was FOB-3, another U.S. Army Special Forces camp. The relationship between the Marines and Special Forces soldiers was strained and contentious. There was no unity of command; the Special Forces were not under Marine Colonel Lownds operational control. There was a lack of communication and coordination between the two groups. The Special Forces worked closely with indigenous troops. The Marines feared FOB-3 had been infiltrated by NVA or Viet Cong agents, as Lang Vei had been when it was first attacked by the NVA in May 1967. Marine Colonel William Dabney, a captain and infantry company commander during the battle, felt the FOB-3 troops were too secretive and independent, and impossible to coordinate operations. According to Dabney, Special Forces did not belong in the pitched battle that was Khe Sanh. “They only inhibit fire support and get in the way.” The Marines were fearful the NVA might attack the Marine position through FOB-3. Former Marine sergeant John Blanco provided evidence of this mistrust when he noted that “the Marine tanks at Khe Sanh had their guns trained on FOB-3.”[39]

On 16 February, Marine tank and Ontos strength was as follows:

CO A(-), 3d AntiTank Battalion (Ten M 50A1 Ontos); four officers and 85 enlisted.
3d Plt, CO B, 3d Tank Battalion (Five M48A3 tanks); one officer, 19 enlisted.[40]

During February, Marine tanks and Ontos fired missions against enemy machine gun and recoilless rifle positions (which resulted in two secondary explosions), enemy mortar positions, and firing in support of maneuvering infantry units. As a result, one enemy recoilless rifle was destroyed, and ten NVA were killed.[41] On 23 February, Khe Sanh was hit especially hard by NVA gunners. During an eight-hour period, 1,307 rounds struck the base. This was the heaviest one-day total of the battle.[42]

Enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar fire struck Khe Sanh daily. For example, of the 175 enemy rounds that hit Khe Sanh on 28 February, one artillery round landed in the Ontos section. This destroyed 36 rounds of 106mm HEPT and 30 rounds of 106mm beehive.[43] Another NVA artillery round impacted in the living bunkers of the Ontos Marines on 4 March, resulting in 10 wounded of which five were evacuated.[44] During February, 190 Marines were killed in action at Khe Sanh, along with 12 soldiers, one airman, and one Navy Seabee.[45]

On 11 March, the Ontos communications bunker sustained a direct hit from an enemy rocket, destroying the bunker. Ontos Corporal Robert Payne was trapped inside, but remained conscious. A friend of Payne’s, armorer John Hargesheimer, helped extracted Payne from the rubble. Payne was conscious and alert, and joked about getting a “million-dollar wound” that would get him “out of the Nam.” Payne was evacuated with a crushed shoulder. Later Hargesheimer learned Payne died of pneumonia on 18 March. That same day an estimated 600 NVA assaulted the eastern perimeter of the base, but were unable to penetrate the wires.[46] During March one Ontos was damaged by shrapnel, and all Ontos repair parts were destroyed by enemy fire.[47]

By mid-March, Marine tank and Ontos strength was as follows:

CO A(-), 3d AntiTank Battalion (Ten M 50A1 Ontos); two officers and 71 enlisted.
3d Plt, CO B, 3d Tank Battalion (Five M48A3 tanks); two officers and 22 enlisted.[48]

On 23 March, 1,109 enemy rounds landed on Khe Sanh (418 artillery, 248 mortar, 214 rocket, 12 recoilless rifles, and 197 unknown). Despite this pounding, there was evidence a turning point in the siege had been reached. An analysis of intelligence evidence indicated the enemy had sustained staggering casualties and realized it was no longer possible to launch an assault against the base. Consequently, the NVA abandoned the siege and began a partial withdrawal of its forces. Even though the NVA infantry was withdrawing, enemy artillery remained active.[49] On 31 March, Operation Scotland, the Marine defense of Khe Sanh, officially ended. Operation Pegasus, the largest Marine offensive of the war, began the following day. During March, 134 Marines were killed at Khe Sanh, along with four soldiers and eight airmen.[50] On 8 April, units of the Army 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) linked up with the Marines at Khe Sanh. This was the official end of the battle for Khe Sanh.

ALTHOUGH THE “BATTLE” ENDS, THE FIGHTING CONTINUES
Unofficially, the fighting continued: on 9 April, a NVA mortar round landed in the Ontos section, wounding six. One of the wounded was Lance Corporal Ray Ferry, age 18, who was unloading old 106mm ammunition crates. Most of the shrapnel was absorbed by the crates, but Ferry was struck in the aorta by a single small piece of shrapnel. Despite heroic efforts by Navy corpsmen and doctors, Ferry died of his wounds.[51] (Navy Corpsman Douglas Dresser, attached to the Ontos section, recalled that 28 Navy corpsmen were killed at Khe Sanh).[52] Death at Khe Sanh did not always come at the hands of the enemy. Ontos Marine PFC Dennis Davidson had been shot in the chest by another Marine during an argument. Due to the serious nature of his wounds, Davidson was evacuated by helicopter. The medevac experienced a mid-air collision, resulting in Davidson’s death on 11 April.[53]

As mentioned, in early 1967 the Marines at Khe Sanh had to wait until Route 9 was upgraded in order to move their tanks and Ontos to Khe Sanh. That summer, heavy rains washed out the highway, making it impossible for the tanks and Ontos to leave. One of the goals of Operation Pegasus was to repair the road in order to again allow overland access to Khe Sanh. This task again fell to the 11^th Engineer Battalion, supported by tanks and infantry. Mines were removed, bridges and culverts were repaired and replaced, bypasses were constructed, and the road was widened. Company C, 11^th Engineers, constructed steel stringer bridges at Dong Ha. A platoon of the 3d Bridge Company, 7^th Engineers, was responsible for the actual emplacement of the bridges. The motto of the bridge company was “Erections are our Business!” CH-54 “Flying Crane” helicopters of the 1^st Air Cavalry Division 470^th Flying Crane Company ferried bridges to three sites along Route 9. These bridges were 30 and 38 feet long, and weighted over eight tons. The final bridge was put into place on 11 April. The following day Route 9 was again capable of allowing the movement of 60-ton traffic across northern South Vietnam for the first time since September, 1967.

The tanks from 3d Platoon, Company B, which had been at Khe Sanh since June 1967, used this opportunity to depart Khe Sanh and return to Company B headquarters at Camp Carroll for long overdue maintenance and repair. They were replaced by the tanks of 1^st Platoon, Company B.[54] Ontos were used in the action to open Route 9, but Ontos use at Khe Sanh itself was minimal during this period. On one occasion the antitank vehicles were lifted by helicopter to one of the nearby hilltop positions. One Ontos was released early, before the helicopter was properly positioned over the landing zone. As a result, the Ontos rolled down a hill into a tree line, suffering minor damage.[55]

On 15 April 15, Operation Pegasus ended. Immediately Operation Scotland II began in the Khe Sanh TAOR. The end of Pegasus brought the departure of the 1^st Air Cavalry Division, which deployed to the south to conduct operations against the NVA in the A Shau Valley. NVA shelling of the base resumed, reaching levels similar to some of the worst days of the siege.

On the eve of the battle, General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, described Khe Sanh as “critical to us from a tactical standpoint” and “even more critical from a psychological point of view.”[56] Nevertheless, in early April, the decision was made to abandon Khe Sanh, even though the 3d Marine Division G-2 estimated there were still probably 10 to 12 NVA battalions in the area.[57] Work began to abandon and destroy the base. Then, on 15 April, the plan was reverse: Khe Sanh would not be destroyed. The North Vietnamese were not leaving either. The 17 April edition of Pacific Stars & Stripes noted at least nine NVA tanks had been introduced into the area.[58]

On 19 April, the NVA ambushed an artillery ammunition supply convoy on Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. This resumption in enemy activity underscored the importance of keeping the Route 9 overland supply corridor open. A “Provisional Mechanized Company” was formed to control the road, consisting of the Ontos company and two platoons of tanks from Company B, 3d Tank Battalion.[59]

On 25 April, a squad of infantry from Company C, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines was on a Route 9 road patrol east of KSCB. It was dark, and the patrol was riding on a tank (C-21). As the tank rounded a bend in the road, the NVA attacked from the front and sides with satchel charges, grenades, and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). The first hit was a RPG round that was deflected off the front of the tank downward, killing the driver, Lance Corporal James Jaynes. Tank commander Corporal Garry Hall fired the .50-cal machine gun while calling for help on the radio. Hall also directed 90mm canister rounds into the enemy positions. At this point the tank careened off the road and rolled down a steep embankment. Coming to a stop at the bottom of a ravine, the crew sprayed the area with their personal weapons and grenades in an attempt to keep the NVA away from the tank. The crew remained in the burning tank until small arms ammunition began exploding. Unable to remove Jayne’s body from the tank, the crew took cover in a nearby foxhole. As the fire spread, 90mm shells inside Hall’s began exploding, throwing debris over the area. The tank crew moved away from the destroyed tank and set up watch for the rest of the night. At 0700 hours the following day, Marines from Company H, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines arrived at the ambush site. When Cpl Hall stood up and waved his arms the rescue party came down the ravine and assisted the tank crew back up to Route 9. They were evacuated for treatment of cuts and scrapes sustained when the tank crashed into the ravine. The tank was a total loss.[60]

187 Marines died in April, as did 61 soldiers and one Navy Seabee.[61]

Although some NVA infantry units left the Khe Sanh area in March, the Command Chronology for 2d Battalion, 1^st Marines noted that the NVA 304^th Division had returned after refitting and regrouping in Laos. By May 1968, the enemy order of battle included three regiments of the NVA 304^th Division, plus a battalion from the 325C Division. Ultimate enemy intentions around Khe Sanh were unclear at this time. What was clear was the NVA had no intention of abandoning the Khe Sanh battlefield. Instead, the NVA were increasing their strength in their sanctuaries in Laos, using their forces in the Khe Sanh TAOR to hamper the ability of the Marines to maneuver easily, and effectively delivering artillery fires on Marine positions. Patrolling continued to be difficult.[62]

In order to more effectively counter NVA ambushes, convoys on Route 9 were accompanied by aerial observers (AOs) and forward air controllers (FACs). This increased the reliance of convoy movement on weather conditions: On 14 May, a convoy scheduled to depart Khe Sanh at 0630 hours was delayed due to low visibility and the inability to maintain an AO. This convoy, accompanied by two tanks plus a company of Marine infantry reinforced by a forward observer and FAC, finally departed at 1000 hours. At 1045 hours it was ambushed by NVA small arms fire, RPGs, and mortars. The lead tank was struck by two RPGs but not disabled. The enemy force broke contact and the convoy proceeded.[63]

Ho Chi Minh was President of North Vietnam. 19 May was his birthday. To commemorate this date, the NVA had planned a bold attack on Khe Sanh Combat Base. They positioned a battalion in well-fortified positions along Route 9, reinforced with large number of RPG teams. Their intention was to allow the daily Marine road sweep patrol to pass through, followed by the daily resupply convoy. The resupply convoy would be ambushed a few miles east of the base, causing the Marines at Khe Sanh to send a reaction force, which would be ambushed by the NVA battalion. By this time, it would be dark, and another Marine force would not be able to reinforce Khe Sanh. All the Marine infantry would be engaged. Khe Sanh would be defended only by support troops. According to the NVA battalion commander (who had been taken prisoner), the NVA would overrun the base.

At 0710 hours on 19 May, the 2d platoon of Company F, 2d Battalion, 1^st Marines, part of the road sweep patrol, observed two NVA. Fighting between the Marines and NVA began, prematurely triggering the planned ambush (the NVA intended for this patrol to pass through the ambush site). Tank B-12 was hit by small arms and RPG fire. Tank B-13 joined B-12 and both maneuvered in pursuit of the enemy. Both tanks were struck by additional RPG rounds, one of which penetrated B-12, injuring the tank commander (Corporal Fred Kellogg), the loader (Lance Corporal Charles Lehman), and the gunner (PFC Carlos Trinidad). The remaining crew member of B-12 (PFC Raymond Bardet) assumed command of the tank, which poured machine gun fire into the NVA positions. Tank B-15 arrived on the scene to assist. Inside B-15 was USMC First Lieutenant Harris Hines, the tank unit commander. B-15 began firing 90mm canister and machine gun fire into the tall grass and spider holes where the RPG teams were hiding. According to Hines, “RPGs were flying everywhere.” Tank B-14 joined the battle. B-14 took a RPG that froze the turret, rendering its main gun useless. B-15 was struck by six RPGs, wounding the crew and leaving the tank dead on the road and smoking. B-11, which had been standing by at Khe Sanh, was called to assist and reached the other tanks at 1315 hours. Fierce fighting continued. B-11 was driven by PFC Stanley Williams, the driver of B-12, which had retired due to damage. It quickly took three RPG hits, none of which penetrated. The NVA assaulted the tank with grenades. B-11 opened up with 90mm and .30 caliber machine gun fire, which broke the NVA attack and saved the Marines from being overrun. All five tanks suffered considerable damage. One was destroyed. Ten Tankers were wounded and evacuated. 37 Marines were killed and 80 evacuated. NVA losses were over 300 KIA, with 100 credited to the Marine tanks.[64]

On 25 May, Company F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, reinforced by two tanks, took possession of a piece of high ground along Route 9 in order to provide security for supply convoys. The position, Lang Kat, overlooked a major NVA infiltration route into the area. The NVA attempted to dislodge the Marines by firing on them with artillery located at Co Roc, Laos. This failed, and at 0100 hours on 28 May the NVA launched a battalion sized infantry attack, supported by artillery. Fighting raged through the night and continued until 1800. The tanks delivered 90mm fire into the attacking NVA. Tanker PFC Raymond Bardet, who was involved in the ambush battle of 19 May, was killed by artillery fire. Total casualties for the fighting on 28 May were 13 Marine KIA, 44 WIA, and over 200 NVA.[65]

Although the siege had long ended, not much had changed at Khe Sanh in May and June. According to USMC Brigadier General Jacob Glick, assistant division commander of the 3d Marine Division, “Khe Sanh was receiving heavy shelling on a daily basis” and “all commander, service, and living facilities were in underground bunkers or deep trenches.”[66] 149 Marines and 19 soldiers were killed in fighting around Khe Sanh in May.[67]

On 9 June, a convoy was proceeding east from Khe Sanh on Route 9 toward Ca Lu. Security was provided by Company F, 2d Battalion, 1^st Marines, reinforced with tanks B13 and B32. After proceeding about five miles, the convoy was attacked by a NVA force of unknown size positioned on both sides of the road with grenades, satchel charges, and RRGs. 11 NVA and eight Marines were killed in the attack, including tanker Sergeant Clifford Evans.[68]

General William Westmoreland had been the biggest supporter of a continued American presence at Khe Sanh. Westmoreland left Vietnam on 11 June. On 19 June, the Marines began implementing their plan for the evacuation and destruction of the base. While previous convoys along Route 9 moved supplies to Khe Sanh, now these convoys moved supplies and equipment from Khe Sanh. North Vietnam proclaimed the withdrawal of the U.S. from Khe Sanh as a victory for the North Vietnamese Army, calling it the “gravest tactical and strategic defeat” for the United States in the Vietnam War.[69] General Westmoreland described the battle this way: “The crushing defeat suffered by the North Vietnamese Army during the siege cost the Communists untold casualties, shattered two of their best divisions, and frustrated their dream of a second Dien Bien Phu.” Years after the battle, when asked to name the decision of which he was most proud, Westmoreland answered, “The decision to hold Khe Sanh.”[70]

Marine tanks and Ontos remained at Khe Sanh while the base was dismantled. Khe Sanh was officially closed on 5 July at 2000 hours. Tanks of the 3d Platoon of Company B maintained a presence at Khe Sanh until that date, providing support for the convoys moving out. The last convoy left the next day. Company A, 3d Antitank Battalion, left on 6 July, one of the last units to leave. 152 Marines died at Khe Sanh in June, followed by 49 more in July.[71] Engineers removed and recovered the bridging that had been installed during Operation Pegasus.[72] Marine tanks and Ontos had supported and defended Khe Sanh to literally the very end.

POSTSCRIPT:

Although the siege had ended and the base was closed, the Marines kept up their presence in the Khe Sanh TAOR. Henceforth, operations would assume a mobile posture instead of relying on large, easy-to-target fixed positions. Fire Support Base Cates was established north of Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Ca Lu; Fire Support Base Shepard was established south of the highway. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 4^th Marines remained near Khe Sanh in the vicinity of Hill 950. Patrols continued to conduct road sweeps along Route 9. On 4 October, a combined Marine and South Vietnamese Army force conducted a general sweep of the area. They found old mass graves, abandoned bunkers and trenches, and military gear. It was evident the NVA had finally left.[73]

Marine tanks and Ontos continued to operate along Route 9 further to the east. They participated in small unit operations, road sweeps, provided security for bridges, and reinforced perimeter defenses at various Marine positions south of the DMZ.[74] On 29 June 1969, the 3d Anti-Tank Battalion, now assigned to Regimental Landing Team 9, embarked for Okinawa. Company B, 3d Tank Battalion, deployed to Okinawa during the period 5-6 November 1969.[75]

[1] R. Scott Berry, “Ontos” in Red Clay, No. 49, Spring, 2001. Available online at http://www.reocities.com/SunsetStrip/bar/8850/issue-49-short-rounds.htm.

[2] Email from Chris Vargo dated 2 June 2011.

[3] Email from Ken Zebal dated 26 May 2011. Email from Lloyd G. Reynolds dated 26 May 2011. See also “M336 90-mm canister anti-personnel tank round” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/m336.htm, accessed 23 June 2011.

[4] Gary L. Telfer, Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr., U.S. Marines in Vietnam : Fighting the North Vietnamese 1967 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984), p. 33-35.

[5] Ray W. Stubbe, Khe Sanh (unpublished manuscript dtd 6 June 1989), pp. 71-72 (hereafter “Stubbe manuscript”). Stubbe was a chaplain at Khe Sanh during the siege. His manuscript “provides a definitive and comprehensive coverage of Khe Sanh.” It is based on many hundreds of accounts provided by Khe Sanh veterans, a very detailed diary kept by Stubbe between July 1967 and March 1968, hundreds of oral history interviews by USMC historians, various files of individual award citations, and “all available documentation (a stack over 20-feet tall) from the USMC, USAF, USA, CIA, DIA, and USN sources.” (p. 2).

[6] Command Chronology, 3d Antitank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, 22 Mar 1967 and 1 Apr 1967.

[7] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings : a Tribute to our Fallen Brothers Who Died Because of the Battlefield of Khe Sanh, Vietnam (Wauwatosa, WI : Khe Sanh Veterans, Inc., 2005), pp,29-32.

[8] R. Scott Berry, “Ontos.”

[9] Stubbe manuscript, pp. 76-77, 84, 130.

[10] Command Chronology, Company A, 3d Antitank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, 10 June 1967.

[11] Stubbe manuscript, p. 174.

[12] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, June 1967. Stubbe manuscript, p 159.

[13] Stubbe manuscript, p. 174.

[14] Command Chronology, 3d Antitank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, 10 July 1967, 31 July 1967

[15] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp, 61-85.

[16] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, 10 September 1967, p. 6.

[17] Command Chronology, 3d Antitank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, 10 September 1967.

[18] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp. 85-88.

[19] Letter from Marine Kevin MacCauley to his parents, 7 September 1967. Diary entry of Ray Stubbe, 10 October 1967. Stubbe manuscript, p. 237.

[20] Command Chronology, 3d Antitank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, 30 September 1967.

[21] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, 10 September 1967, p. 7.

[22] Command Chronology, 3d Antitank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, October 1967, dated 10 December 1967.

[23] Command Chronology, 1/26, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 269.

[24] Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam : the defining year, 1968 (Washington, D.C. : History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), p. 255.

[25] Stubbe manuscript, p. 354.

[26] Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp. 89-102.

[27] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, December 1967, p. 5.

[28] Operation Scotland Intelligence Summary, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 260.

[29] John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 270-271. Sedgwick D Tourison and Ray W Stubbe, B5-T8 in 48 QXD : the secret official history of the North Vietnamese Army of the siege at Khe Sanh, Vietnam, Spring, 1968 (Wauwautosa, Wis. : Ray W. Stubbe, 2006), pp. 26-27. Peter McDonald, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), p. 279.

[30] CG III MAF message 161200Z/Jan68 in III MAF MSGS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE #20, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 322.

[31] Stubbe manuscript, p. 367.

[32] Bronze Star Medal file on First Lieutenant John W. Dillon, Stubbe manuscript, p. 357.

[33] Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam : the defining year, 1968 (Washington, D.C. : History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), p. 260.

[34] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, January 1968, pp. 20-21.

[35] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp. 102-146.

[36]Krulak is quoted in FMFPAC, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, Feb68, p. 26, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 525.

[37] III MAF COC 151527Z/Feb68, National Photographic Interpretation Center 3011, IN iii maf coc j7f 15/16Feb68 #307, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 569.

[38] III MAF COC 252255Z/Feb68, MSN #5385, in III MAF COC J&F 26/27Feb68 #13, in Stubbe manuscript. P. 637.

[39] Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam : the defining year, 1968, p. 277n.

[40] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, p. 186.

[41] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, February 1968, p4.

[42] Moyers S. Shore II, The Battle for Khe Sanh (Washington, D.C. : History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1969), p. 122.

[43] III MAF COC 290429Z/Feb 68, Daily report on Khe Sanh, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 643.

[44] /Mar68, Operation Scotland SITREP, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 664.

[45] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp. 147-228.

[46] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, p. 244. Letter from Hargesheimer to Ray Stubbe dated 20Jul85 in Stubbe manuscript, p. 675.

[47] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, March 1968, p8.

[48] Stubbe manuscript, p. 677.

[49] Shore, The Battle for Khe Sanh, p. 127. MACV Command History, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 380, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 686, 687.

[50] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp. 228-270.

[51] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, p. 287.

[52] Comments of Douglas Dresser to Ray Stubbe, 26Sep87, Stubbe manuscript, p. 720.

[53] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, p. 290.

[54] James P. Coan, “Route 9, the Road to Khe Sanh,” in Sponsor Box/USMC Vietnam Tankers Association, April-June, 2011, p. 30. Sea Tiger, Vol. 4, No. 18, 3 May 1968, p. 3, in Stubbe manuscript.

[55] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, April 1968, p7.

[56] Message from Westmoreland to Army General Earle Wheeler (Chairman, JCS) dtd 12Jan68 in Stubbe manuscript, p. 438.

[57] Comments of BGen Jacob Glick, Assistant Commander, 3dMarDiv, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 747.

[58] Ray Stubbe diary entry of 14 April, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 756.

[59] Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam : the defining year, 1968, p. 316.

[60] Command Chronology, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, April 1968, in Stubbe manuscript. This battle is also detailed in an email from Garry Hall to Peter Brush dated 16 May 2011.

[61] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp. 271-318.

[62] Command Chronology, 2d Battalion, 1^st Marines, May 1968; Comments of BGen Carl Hoffman, ADC, 3dMarDiv; Comments of 1/Lt Glen Suydam (a CO in 2/1) in Stubbe manuscript, p. 791.

[63] 3dMarDiv COC May68, OPN Scotland II SITREP #117, in Stubbe manuscript, p. 797.

[64] Stubbe manuscript, pp. 805-808. Stubbe’s account is based on 3dMarDiv COC reports, Operation Scotland SitReps, FMFPac SitReps,various Bronze and Silver Medal citation reports, and personal accounts of participants in the ambush and subsequent battle.

[65] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp. 336.

[66] Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam : the defining year, 1968, p. 320.

[67] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp. 318- 340.

[68] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, July 1968, p. 13. Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, p. 348.

[69] “Hanoi Ridicules U.S. Over KheSanh” in New York Times, June 29, 1968, p. 1.

[70] Quoted in Shore, The Battle for Khe Sanh, p. viii. Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam : the defining year, 1968, p. 326.

[71] Ray Stubbe, Battalion of Kings, pp. 340-360 (June) and pp. 360-372 (July).

[72] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, July 1968, p. 7, 8. Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam : the Defining Year, 1968, p. 326.

[73] Stubbe manuscript, pp. 847-849.

[74] Command Chronology, 3d Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division, FMF, November 1968, p. 7.

[75] Charles R. Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam : High Mobility and Standdown, 1969 (Washington, D.C. : History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1988), p. 135.