37th ARVN Ranger Battalion
In this interview, US Army Captain Walter Gunn, Jr., senior advisor to the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, describes the contributions of the South Vietnamese Army unit in the defense of Khe Sanh combat base during the 1968 siege.
[The insignia of the ARVN Rangers-a snarling panther with whiskers partly obscuring the five-pointed star of the nationalist government of South Vietnam].
Cpt. Walter A. Gunn, Jr., was Senior Advisor to the 37th ARVN Ranger Bn. How he arrived is told in his own words:
“I arrived in Vietnam in the last week of December 1967 at Saigon, and had no idea that I would ever end up assigned to the Vietnamese Rangers or would ever be attached to the 26 Marines at Khe Sanh. I had trained at Ft. Bragg, NC, to be an Advisor to a Regional or Popular Force unit. I knew these type units would stay pretty well around their home village. After 3 days in Saigon, I received my orders that I was being assigned to I Corps. I arrived in Da Nang on 1 January 1968. I recall reporting to Corps Headquarters G-1, and being asked if I would like to be assigned to a Vietnamese Ranger unit. I remember telling the Colonel that was asking me this question that I thought I was trained to work with RF or PF units. He told me to think about it over night and give him my answer the following day.
“I remember the following morning being awakened by the detachment 1st Sgt and being told that I had to get my gear together and board a helicopter for transport to Quang Tri Province to join the 1st Ranger Group. I asked the 1st Sgt about what the Col had said; I thought I had a choice. He told me that I was the only Ranger qualified Officer replacement for an officer killed in the past few days. After a week or two in Quang Tri Province, the Ranger Group returned to Da Nang to recuperate and conduct small unit operations around their base camp. I was then assigned to the position of Senior Advisor to the 37th Ranger Bn.
“On or about the 25th of January 1968, I was informed that I and the 37th Bn Commander were to take a trip to the Marine Combat Base at Khe Sanh and make coordination for our move to the base. Grabbing a map of the area of Khe Sanh and locating where it was located made me aware for the first time of its isolated position in Vietnam. I recall my helicopter flight to the base and talking to my Counterpart in route about the area. He was not excited about the place nor about deploying there, which in turn gave me thoughts to think about concerning the place we were going. I remember upon the approach to Khe Sanh the pilot told us that the base was receiving incoming artillery and rockets and, as soon as he touched down, that we were to get off quickly or we would be returning immediately back with him to Dong Ha. After a 3-to-4-hour reconnoiter of the Combat Base, and coordination with members of HQ 26th Marines concerning the move there, and the location of the perimeter we were to occupy, I thought then: ‘what in the hell was I getting into.
thought then: ‘what in the hell was I getting into.’ “Upon returning to Da Nang, I guess I did not show a great deal of enthusiasm toward the move. I had never worked with or been attached to another unit outside of the Army. I was not sure about how this operation was going to be, being attached to a Marine command. I guess at that time I was not really sure of myself, being an advisor to an ARVN unit, and working under the command of the Marine Corps, and not knowing what I would carry away from Khe Sanh after the Siege.
“When I left the base in April, 1968, I only had the deepest respect for the Marines, especially the 26th. I had the pleasure of knowing the 26th Commander, Col Lownds, and his staff. Col Wilkinson, Ken Pipes, and Hank Norman, who was with us a brief while as Arty. F.O. until he was pulled to go with Bravo Company on an operation in which he was killed. Hank was a fine officer, a fine Marine, a fine person. I am proud to have known him. And to all other Marines in the trenches that I met on a day-to-day contact, names and faces I can’t recall. I gained a lot experience and knowledge from my tour in Vietnam, the respect towards other combat units, and I put to rest the things I had heard about the ARVN units. I found myself proud of the ARVN Ranger units, their history, and their ability to do their job. These Vietnamese units were a proud lot, and a source that I could learn from. I am to this day proud that I was picked to be a Ranger Advisor, and proud that I had a chance to work with the Marines, and to be part of the Battle for Khe Sanh.”
The NVA officer who had surrendered on 20 Jan, Lt La Thanh Tonc, revealed that the NVA plan was to seize Hills 861 and 881S as fire support bases from which troops would push against the northern and western sections of the KSCB perimeter as a diversion. The main assault was to be a regimental-size thrust against the eastern sector, and thus collapse the entire defense.
Col Lownds was therefore especially concerned about that sector, especially since it did not enclose the eastern end of the runway and had planned for positions to be manned 200 yards further out from the existing KSCB lines. It was here the 318 men of the 37th would be placed. (The 37th was some 100-150 men short of full strength).
The 37th arrived by C-130s 1400-1530 on 27 Jan and began preparing defensive positions in front of the KSCB perimeter manned by B/1/26. The next day two rockets landed in the Bn area resulting in one ARVN WIA and evacuated. Another was evacuated the next day from a mortar. As soldiers were evacuated, no new replacements arrived until 6 March, thus gradually depleting their strength.
Lt Hank Norman and PFC Peters were permanently assigned from 1/13 as arty FOs on 30 Jan. On 31 Jan a Ranger was bitten by a snake and evacuated to Phu Bai. By 3 Feb, tactical wire was completed. The positions received 17 rounds of mortar and artillery but there were no casualties and no damage.
Di Uy Pho, the Commander of the 37th, was beginning to exhibit indications that he should be relieved. There was a machinegun atop the CP bunker, and when Pho attempted to ring up the Commander of First Company on the LIMA-LIMA and he didn’t answer the phone-nor the radio either-Pho, attempting to get their attention, went to the machinegun and fired a burst towards the First Company bunker. It just so happened the Company Commander was in the door. He was killed by the burst. As early as 4 Feb, Capt Gunn discussed moving the Bn CP bunker out of the front lines, but Pho didn’t concur. Capt Gunn also discovered the tactical wire in 3d Company area was too close to their trenchline, but Pho was unconcerned.
Eventually, he would not accept Col. Lownds being his commander and said he would only take orders from the Vietnamese chain of command, and then it got to the point where he refused orders from them, and he was recalled, and the Bn XO, Lt. Troung, was in charge of the 37th for most of the Siege.
When the ARVN lines were completed, the lines manned by B/1/26 had not altered. Specifically, there were still Claymore mines: “I’d get up every morning and I’d look at all those two, three hundred claymores looking at me! So, I mentioned it right at the beginning. I said, ‘Hey, I can’t live like that! I went to Ken Pipes and he talked to the Colonel and they agreed to pull them. And Ken Pipes is the one that got that worked out for me and also built a little trench so myself and the other Americans could get out along with the two from the Marines there that were FOs.”
Another ARVN Bn, their sister unit, the 21st Rangers, were due to arrive at Khe Sanh also, but the Battle of Hue City diverted them.
After receiving 700 incoming rounds on 7 Feb 68 (the day Lang Vei fell) and 400 incoming rounds on 8 Feb (the day A/1/9’s Hill 64 outpost was assaulted), one of the ARVN soldiers was evacuated with a heart attack, making a total of six now evacuated.
On 12 Feb, the 37th lines received fire from two recoilless rifles. The next day the Rangers dispatched a six-man patrol to the NVA position (XD859410) and Capt Gunn waited anxiously:
“Approx 1000 hour, we heard a great deal of firing, and there was a lot of fog. We couldn’t see what was going on at the time. Around 1030 hours the fog lifted. We saw our patrol. They had caught a two-man recoilless rifle team and captured the 82 recoilless rifle. At first, they thought it was a 57 recoilless, but when we got it back here, we found out it was a Russian-built 82mm. They’re real proud because as far as I know this is the first one captured in Vietnam.”
A young ARVN Lieutenant, seriously wounded during this action, killed himself to prevent further casual ties to his troops as they attempted to rescue him and were picked-off by NVA snipers, one by one. Later in the day, Gunn requested an indirect weapon from Regiment, and was issued a 106 recoilless rifle.
On 16 Feb, a patrol by the 37th Rangers engaged a company-size NVA unit at XD849409. During the skirmish, a well-developed and elaborate bunker complex capable of supporting a regiment was discovered, organized according to the terrain and not readily visible from the KSCB perimeter. Capt Gunn suggested that the only ordnance effective against this bunker complex would be D-2B (M-117, 750-1b. bomb), D-9 (Mk-77, 500-1b. napalm bomb), D-10 (?), or D-26 (M-117, 750-1b. bomb with a 1-second delay enabling 16-ft. penetration before detonation).
On 21 Feb, the 37th Rangers spotted a hundred or so NVA moving toward them. The enemy force was prob ably battalion size since the ARVNs monitoring the NVA radio net heard them talking over four or five different radios. KSCB received 250 rounds of mortar, 50 rounds of artillery, and 70 rounds of rockets in connection with this attack. At one point, there were 75 incoming rounds in one five-minute period.
The Rangers halted the advance some 50 meters from their lines, and an aircraft was called to deliver bombs. The TPQ-10 strike came in on the wrong heading and dropped the bombs between the ARVN and B/1/26 lines, collapsing the Ranger CP bunker and making a 40-ft. crater. Huge clumps of mud began to fall from the sky, one of which broke the arm of a Marine of B/1/26 who huddled in the trench for protection.
Cpl Ted Golab, a Marine enlisted FO detailed to the Rangers from 1/13 had been on top of a bunker-to adjust fires on the approaching NVA when the incoming barrage struck. Fortunately, none of the Rangers were seriously injured. One had been thrown up against a wall and broke his wrist. Another came running to Golab crying like a baby. Golab assured him he was OK, put a battle dressing on his bleeding head, and gave the Ranger his own steel helmet (-which, in that situation, was a gift of life-an ordinary act of heroism exposing himself to injury). In the days that followed, that Ranger never removed Golab’s helmet. Golab received a Ranger beret, a shirt with the Ranger patch [pictured on p. 37 of this magazine], and a purple scarf, and wherever he went, a Ranger rifleman now always accompanied him. “Them guys,” he says, “were great. They’d be eating our food and I’d be eating their food.”
Capt Ken Pipes (CO, B/1/26), interviewed while still at KSCB, noted a high regard and deep respect for the Rangers: “We shared ammunition, food, and many difficult experiences. They were professionally and ably led. Their junior officers and NCOs were of the highest caliber. The individual men were brave, dedicated, and fearless combat soldiers .. The Tet Offensive was centered around towns, villages and hamlets from which most of the Rangers were recruited. They did not know the effect that the NVA Tet Offensive had on their families and loved ones. Could we have done as well under those circumstances? Marines and corpsmen would voluntarily make almost nightly trips to the ARVN lines to carry wounded rangers to the Regimental Aid Station …”
Ray Strischek [a communications man with First Marine Air Wing detailed to KSCB] once recalled his meeting with an ARVN Ranger:
“Food got scarce and for three to five days (I can’t really remember) we went to one C-rat per day. Well, I with my telephone and pliers and a Vietnamese Ranger with his carbine and floppy shower shoes spied some fool dumping what looked like hundreds of cans of C-rats into a barrel. Me and the Viet Ranger eyed each other, eyed the barrel and ran for it. We were running along, elbowing each other and laughing. (We didn’t know each other). Apparently neither of us could really believe someone would throw food away. When we got to the barrel, it was full of C-rat cans alright. The Viet Ranger picked up a can, I picked up a can. All the cans were the same. All Ham and Lima Beans. The Ranger grunted, cursed and spat, and said ‘Chit numba Ten Thou.’ (Word gets around, you know!) We walked away from Ham and Lima Beans. He pulled out some Viet rations: a clear plastic bag, I guess of fried fish eyes and minnow like parts. I had a can of fruit cocktail. We shared. Couldn’t understand a word he said and vice versa. Whatever it was tasted pretty good. We parted friends.”
During the night of 29Feb/01Mar (it was Leap Year this year, thus 29 Feb), a regimental-size (or greater) assault was made by the NVA against the eastern perimeter, just as Lt Tonc had indicated, although not timed to correspond to the assault on Hill 861 (the assault on 881-S was probably preempted by the movement of I/3/26 to 881-N on 20 Jan). Maj Mirza M. Baig, the amazing Pakistani-born genius serving as TIO, later noted that this attack reflected the NVA’s rigidity and inflexibility of mind, not altering his plan or tactics from the original plans, and might indicate that the huge B-52 strike on the NVA Front HQ, while not killing Gen. Giap, did manage to catch senior commanders and their staffs .. for if anyone could have changed the attack master plan, these officers could. Since the plan was never changed, perhaps they died in the bombing.”
in the bombing.” The brunt of the attack was directed against the 37th Ranger lines. It was to be the deciding engagement of the Siege battle of Khe Sanh, spelling the NVA defeat at Khe Sanh. Many of the defenders at KSCB never fired a shot, and the main NVA assault “passed with a whimper instead of a roar.” [Moyers Shore, Battle for Khe Sanh, p. 125].
FOB-3 possessed a captured NVA codebook containing all their operational codes, cyphers, and frequencies for the entire Siege. Since most of the artillery was fired by command over radio nets, those in the FOB usually had advance warning. Harve Saal recalls that a NVA message intercepted and decrypted described the large ground attack and indicated the use of hand-held pyrotechnics as signaling for it, including “cease fire” and “retreat.” [Note: on 28 May 68, during a very ferocious attack on F/2/3, the acting Co CO, 1Lt James L. Jones, Jr., later Major General, together with his company Gunny decided to shoot some green pencil flares, the signal that had launched the attack against them, and the NVA temporarily retreated] During this night, when the major attack was mounting, he fired the appropriate signal for “cease fire/retreat,” and suddenly, in the darkness of the sky, numerous other flares suddenly exploded — flares fired by other SF in the FOB-3 also! Undoubtedly the confusion in the NVA ranks was an additional factor against them.
Strings of electronic sensors announced the assembly and assault as NVA troops moved towards KSCB from Route 9, and the mass was decimated by Firecracker munitions, 175s, TPQ-10s, and two diverted Arc Lights which dropped their ordnance only 750 yards from the ARVN positions. The official record of this attack describes the gristly scene of the battlefield when a patrol from the ARVN rangers examined it soon after sunrise: ”
“A physical reconnaissance of the area later that same morning revealed 78 NVA KIA with numerous bangalores [bamboo filled with explosives that are shoved under the barbed wire and detonated to make an opening] and satchel charges, indicating a major effort to breach the wire had been planned. The dead were still huddled in trenches, many in the kneeling position, in three successive lines, as if they had been caught in the assault position. The devastating effect of the ‘FIRECRACKER’ round was apparent.”
Maj Mark A. Swearengen, the Liaison Officer from 2d Bn, 94th Artillery, at KSCB to coordinate 175mm gun fire from Camp Carroll and the Rockpile, made the interesting observation that the attack occurred about 40 days after the first ground attack. This is the length of time feudal armies usually besieged, and the soldiers then were only paid fora 40-day commitment. Failure to fella fortress within 40 days, the attacking forces simply departed the siege.
The Rangers were to experience additional probes on 18 and 29 March as well as a loud speaker propaganda effort calling them to surrender, but the main NVA effort had been made and had been defeated. Capt Gunn had arrived with 425 men, and 65 more arrived on 6 March, fora total of 490 brought to Khe Sanh. When the 37th departed during Operation PEGASUS, they had sustained 12 KIA and 61 WIA. MIA.
Source Note: This article was published in Red Clay, Issue No. 41 (Spring, 1998). This a special issue highlighting US Army activity during the Siege.